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Abstract 
Local governments are reluctant to contract out public services. This paper shows that 
resistance to contracting out is not at odds with efficiency. The sample includes all 135 
municipalities that were distributing gas in an Italian region when a national reform ended in-
house delivery. Contracting out decisions have been analyzed for the subsequent 12 years 
through a duration model that admits time dependence and interaction with inter-municipal 
cooperation. It has been found that opposition to service outsourcing is more likely if scale 
and managerial efficiency have already been enhanced. Fiscal stress and the activism of 
citizens are shown not to play a significant role.  
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1. Introduction 
Public services have undergone extensive reforms in recent years, particularly at the local 
level. A prominent role in restructuring efforts has been played by the diffusion of service 
contracts. During the last two decades, a significant number of cities have outsourced the 
services for which they are responsible, to private or alternative public providers. Contracting 
out was devised primarily as a means of improving efficiency through an expansion of the 
scale of operations, a reduction in management discretion and a better insulation from 
pressure groups.  
Nevertheless, as Section 2 shows, there are signals that contracting out is likely to remain a 
subordinate delivery mode in local governments. The adoption of service contracts varies to a 
great extent from country to country and sector to sector. This is not surprising because 
transaction costs vary according to the market and services characteristics. What is more 
puzzling is the limited diffusion of service contracts, even in those sectors and countries that 
are more open towards them. However, reluctance to shift to external delivery is not 
necessarily a symptom of a poor efficiency-seeking attitude (Section 3). An in-house public 
provider could in fact have already reached the optimal scale of operations, or strengthened 
control over managers (through corporatization or partial privatization). In addition, 
efficiency gains can be pursued through alternative restructuring options, notably inter-
municipal joint ventures. Finally, contracting out decisions could be made because of fiscal 
constraints or local politics, i.e. with little or no relationship with efficiency.  
The analysis that is illustrated in the rest of the paper is an attempt to discover the reasons for 
the reluctance of local governments to contract out, and to assess the efficiency of resistance. 
The Italian local gas distribution sector has been used as an empirical setting. In 2000, the 
national Parliament approved a gas sector reform (Section 4). The reform and subsequent acts 
obliged municipalities to cease direct delivery, and to award the service contract via 
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competitive tendering procedures. The dataset includes all of the 135 municipalities that 
operated the gas distribution service at the date the reform was introduced in Lombardy, a 
region in Northern Italy with almost 10 million inhabitants. At the end of 2012, the time 
extensions granted to in-house public delivery had run out, but a highly differentiated 
landscape emerged. Only 37% of the municipalities had contracted out the service and, in 
most cases, the choice had been deferred for as long as possible. The remaining municipalities 
had openly opposed contracting out (e.g. by appealing to the Antitrust or administrative 
courts) or had shifted to inter-municipal cooperation. 
Italy and, in particular, Lombardy are good candidates for the study of the efficiency of gas 
delivery choices (Section 4). The gas distribution service is substantially homogeneous from 
municipality to municipality, due to the technological maturity and nation-wide standards and 
regulations. This means that transaction costs are unlikely to act as confounding factors, i.e. 
differences in market and service characteristics can only cause delivery differences to a 
limited extent. Homogeneous market and service attributes are also likely to level out the 
market field for potential entrants. At the same time, the municipalities in Lombardy can be 
argued to be quite heterogeneous in terms of efficiency, owing to the differences in size and 
governance of the public utilities, and to other determinants (local politics, public budget 
constraints, civic society).  
The main contribution of the paper is that it does a test of the hypothesis that the reluctance of 
local governments towards contracting out is based upon efficiency reasons. Since resistance 
to contracting out can translate not only into opposition but also into deferred compliance, we 
model not only the choice to contract out but also the contract timing (Gonzalez-Gomes and 
Guardiola 2009; Miralles 2009). Secondly, since some of the motives for contracting out can 
also justify inter-municipal cooperation (Warner and Hebdon 2001; Hefetz et al. 2012), 
contracting out municipalities have been distinguished from both cooperating and inactive 
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municipalities.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the authors’ interest in the 
resistance of local governments to contracting out by discussing the diffusion of service 
contracts at the European Union level. Pre-existing literature is reviewed, and research 
questions are summarized in Section 3. Section 4 highlights the structure and recent evolution 
of the gas distribution sectors in Italy and in Lombardy, provides information on the data and 
variables and presents the econometric strategy. The empirical findings are discussed in 
Section 5. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the main conclusions.     
     
2. The diffusion of public service contracts in the European Union 
This Section focuses on local governments in European Union (EU) countries with the aim of 
offering some evidence that public service outsourcing is far from contesting the dominance 
of in-house provision. 
In recent decades, EU countries have increasingly experienced public service outsourcing 
(reference can be made to Domberger and Jensen 1997, Nemec et al. 2005, Warner and Bel 
2008, Johansson 2008). Even though consistent information is lacking about delivery 
arrangements in the EU countries and over the years, recent information on the new service 
contracts of EU local governments can be sourced on an online version of the supplement of 
the Official Journal of the European Union (the so called “Tenders Electronic Daily”).1  
A descriptive analysis has been carried out for the 2009-2011 period. Evidence on the 
distribution of new outsourcing contracts for municipal services and in EU countries is 
summarized in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix. Two main findings are here discussed. 
Before proceeding we emphasize that the comparison between countries should be very 
                                                 
1 In EU countries, the publication of public procurement tenders has been compulsory since 2004, whenever the 
contract has a value equal to or larger than a given threshold (200,000 Euros in 2012).   
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cautious because the number of contracts is influenced by the typical size of local authorities 
that varies over countries.  
First, the service contracts are unevenly distributed. Contracting out has been shown to be 
concentrated on sewage, solid waste and cleaning services (around half of the overall number 
of contracts). However the diffusion of contracting out is particularly low for public utilities 
(i.e. water, gas, electricity), public security and rescue services, cultural and sporting services. 
France has adopted contracting out more than any other EU country. Private outsourcing is 
also quite frequent in the UK and the Netherlands, but these countries are gradually reducing 
the use of service contracts. Germany, Italy and Poland are relatively less active, but they are 
increasingly adopting contracting out.  
Second, contracting out seems to be a relatively rare event. A city or urban area with a 
population of 10,000, i.e. a medium-sized EU local authority, publishes 0.31 contract notices 
in 3 years, i.e. around one contract notice every 10 years. Even “outsourcing champions”, 
such as local governments in France or in the Netherlands, are likely to rely extensively on in-
house public delivery. In other words, few municipal services are contracted out in the EU.  
ome countries and some services seem to be impermeable to contracting out, while others are 
clearly cutting down on its use. Reference to North-America helps to contextualize the 
analysis. American and Canadian cities have a significant tradition of outsourcing (Lòpez-de-
Silanes et al. 1997, Boyne 1998, Warner and Hebdon 2001, Hebdon and Jalette 2008). 
However, the private provision of municipal services seems to have reached a saturation 
threshold in the US. The use of service contracts increased from 15% to 17% in US cities in 
the 1992-2007 period (Hefetz et al. 2012).  
While differences in outsourcing diffusion between various EU countries and sectors can be 
framed in terms of differences in transaction costs, the resistance of countries and sectors that 
are quite advanced in the restructuring path opens the question on the potential advantages of 
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public delivery (Section 3), and suggests analyzing a single-country, single-service setting, as 
has been done in the remaining part of the analysis by considering the Lombardy gas 
distribution sector (Section 4).  
 
3. Literature review and research questions 
This Section reviews the economic and policy literature on the motives behind the resistance 
to contracting out. The research hypotheses are also formulated, in order to design our 
analysis of the Italian gas distribution case.  
Most papers on contracting out assume that local governments rationally compare external v. 
internal provision choices, and base their assessment primarily on efficiency arguments. 
Willingness to improve efficiency is not sufficient to contract out, since public delivery is a 
rational choice if transaction costs between the local government and external providers are 
large (Williamson 1981 and 1999, Warner and Hebdon 2001, Brown and Potoski 2003). Since 
transaction costs are related to service and country characteristics, they can be considered as 
the point of reference to explain why the diffusion of outsourcing differs from country to 
country and sector to sector, as documented in Section 2.2 Nevertheless, transaction costs are 
less useful to explain another hint of Section 2, i.e. the slowdown of contract outsourcing in 
some EU countries and sectors. Moreover, they shed little light upon the question why the 
same service is contracted out by some local governments and not by others, as in the case of 
Italian gas distribution. Other efficiency determinants have therefore been considered. The 
role of other restructuring options and other theoretical perspectives are also summarized.  
                                                 
2 Contractual costs are mainly due to limited information and uncertainty, which increase with some service 
characteristics (Levin and Tadelis 2010): difficulty to measure quality performances, necessity to adapt to 
external circumstances, hold up risks, exposure of citizens to quality problems. On the other hand transaction 
costs are also shaped by market and citizen characteristics. Countries can differ according to competition (i.e. 
opportunities to use the private market), cooperation potential (i.e. opportunities to use the “civic” market), and 
citizen interest in service provision (Hefetz and Warner 2012). 
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3.1. Efficiency of resistance to contracting out?  
Contracting out was devised primarily as a means of improving efficiency, i.e. of increasing 
the scale of operations, of insulating service provision from pressure groups and of reducing 
management discretion (e.g. Savas 1987, Dubin and Navarro 1988, Lopez-de-Silanes et al. 
1997, Bel and Miralles 2003, Dijkgraaf et al. 2003, Sørensen 2007). In a similar way to the 
most recent works, it is here emphasized that the link between contracting out and cost 
reduction is contingent to an array of external factors, i.e. public delivery does not imply per 
se the rejection of efficiency hypothesis.3 
In-house provision is often characterized by a suboptimal scale of operations, while 
contracting out is seen as a way of improving productive efficiency by shifting the service to a 
larger provider. However, if public providers already exploit an efficient size or mix of 
services, local governments have less compelling motives to contract out (Bel and Miralles 
2003, Warner 2011, Warner and Hebdon 2001, Hefetz et al. 2012). Political economy and 
public choice theories claim that competitive contracting out is a suitable measure to restrain 
the patronage practices that are typical of public monopolies. Inefficiency of public delivery is 
due to the lack of market discipline over self-interested politicians (Savas 1987, Lopez-de-
Silanes et al. 1997, Hirsch and Osborne 2000). While inefficient practices are spurred by 
pressure groups and lobbies (Boyne 1998, Bel and Fageda 2009), they are hindered by a 
socially and politically active citizenship (see 3.2 and 3.3).  Finally, the literature on 
contracting out decisions has dealt less frequently with weak governance and managerial 
dominance. Much emphasis has been put on the shift from public to private provision, but 
managerial performances can be improved by means of alternative restructuring measures. 
                                                 
3 The determinants of contracting out and competitive bidding in local governments have been the subject of 
several empirical analyses, particularly for the European utility sectors, e.g. urban waste (Bel and Miralles 2003, 
Sørensen 2007, Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2008), water (Menard and Saussier 2000, Miralles 2008, Gonzalez-Gomez 
and Guardiola 2009, Fitch 2007, Carrozza 2010), and urban transport (Cambini and Filippini 2003, Yvrande-
Billon 2006, Amaral et al. 2009). 
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For instance, corporatization implies the transfer of control rights from politicians to 
managers, an arrangement that affects the managers’ incentives to perform efficiently 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1994, Stiglitz 2000), while partial privatization aligns managers to 
private shareholders’ incentives and makes monitoring easier (Gupta 2005). It is therefore not 
surprising that local governments that have already created municipal corporations or have 
partially privatized municipal providers have less propensity towards private provision 
(Aivazian et al. 2005, Bilodeau et al. 2007, Bel and Fageda 2010).  
 
3.2. Efficiency of inter-municipal joint ventures 
An additional reason why resistance to contracting out is not necessarily inefficient is that 
local governments can assign the service to inter-municipal joint ventures (IMJVs, mergers 
between municipal utilities). IMJVs can yield efficiency gains that are comparable with, or 
even greater than private outsourcing (Warner and Hebdon 2001, Bel and Mur 2009, Hefetz et 
al. 2012). IMJVs are relatively easy to arrange and can achieve objectives that are consistent 
with those to which contracting out is directed (Morgan and Hirlinger 1991), e.g. economies 
of scale beyond a single jurisdiction.4 In addition, they constitute a politically attractive 
alternative because they are compatible with political participation and public accountability 
(Warner and Hefetz 2002). Finally, according to political economy theories, dispersed public 
ownership protects the delivery of public services from political interference (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1994, Boycko et al. 1996). The agency theory instead suggests that the fragmentation 
of public control that accompanies IMJVs leads to greater agency costs (Dixit 1997).                  
 
 
                                                 
4 At the same time, local governments experience lower transaction costs, since the risks associated with 
opportunism of the providers and with goal incongruence between the local government and the provider are 
minimized (Brown and Potoski 2003). 
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3.3. Other determinants of resistance to contracting out 
The resistance of local governments to contracting out can be based on motives that have an 
indirect or weak relationship with service efficiency, e.g. citizens’ voice and participation, 
political ideology and healthy fiscal conditions.    
Politics was traditionally seen as an antecedent of contracting out decisions in several US and 
European studies (see among others, McGuire et al. 1987, Dubin and Navarro 1988, Lopez de 
Silanes et al. 1997, Bel and Miralles 2003, Dijkgraaf et al. 2003). An enlarged definition of 
efficiency in delivery choices has recently been developed. The social choice framework 
combines different approaches to explain why a deliberation process, which involves citizens, 
local governments and providers, can ensure socially-superior arrangements (Warner and 
Hebdon 2001, Warner and Hefetz 2004, Hefetz and Warner 2007 and 2012). In particular, 
transaction costs and the citizens’ voice has been identified as the most significant sources of 
the shift in preference from contracting out to reverse contracting in US cities over the last 
few decades (Hefetz and Warner 2007).5 Political ideology is another possible determinant. 
Conservative governments (i.e. linked to right-wing parties) are usually associated with a 
preference for private service delivery. Finally, contacting out is more likely if local 
governments have the aim of healing fiscal stress. Service privatization could enhance the 
public budget, because it weakens cost-increasing practices, such as managerial dominance 
and political patronage (Lopez-de-Silanes et al. 1997, Kodrzycki 1998, Zullo 2009). This is 
an efficiency-enhancing effect (see 3.1)). Additionally, if service outsourcing is accompanied 
by the sale of assets, the incoming cash flows can cause relief from fiscal constraints, an 
effect that is neutral from an efficiency perspective.    
                                                 
5 The dichotomy between markets and planning, or between contracting out and internal delivery,  is replaced by 
an iterative process in which local governments balance the costs and benefits of competition (supported by new 
public management), the need to structure markets (supported by the transaction costs theory) and the need to 
ensure the citizens’ voice (supported by new public service and communicative planning). 
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3.4. Research hypotheses  
In order to analyze the link between resistance to contracting out and efficiency in the service 
offer, we focus on productive and managerial efficiency. Unfortunately, there is a lack of 
good empirical indicators of political patronage at the local level, and the discipline of self-
interested politicians has not been considered.  
A) Are local governments more likely to stick to public delivery if they are already efficient 
in service production (i.e. scale and scope economies have already been exploited)? 
B) Are local governments more likely to stick to public delivery if they are already efficient 
in managing the service (i.e. the public provider has been corporatized or partially 
privatized)?  
In addressing the research questions, we recognize (i) the opportunity to use inter-municipal 
cooperation rather than contracting out (3.2), and (ii) the role of fiscal stress and social choice 
(3.3). 
 
4. Empirical setting and methods 
This Section deals with the empirical case that is analyzed in the remaining parts of the paper 
and our methodology, i.e. variables, the sample, and econometric models.  
 
4.1 The gas distribution service in Italy and Lombardy 
The empirical setting is that of the gas distribution in Lombardy, a region in North Italy. 
Lombardy has been chosen as the case study, because it is the largest regional natural gas 
market in Italy. In 2012, 4.8 million customers were supplied with 8,992 million mc of natural 
gas (i.e. roughly one fourth of the national supply), through distribution networks that cover a 
10 
 
distance of 47,033 km and which reach nearly all the municipalities.6 At the same time, the 
collection of detailed information for the whole country has proved to be difficult.  
Most municipalities in the North and in Central Italy have traditionally ensured the 
distribution of gas for cooking and heating through in-house municipal delivery, but 
increasing concerns about the efficiency of public delivery have been expressed since the 
mid-Eighties (Bognetti and Robotti 2003). Soft budget constraints and the fragmentation of 
operations over many small municipal enterprises or departments have been acknowledged to 
be the major causes of inefficiency.7  
In 2000, the national Parliament issued a law that implemented the 1998 EU Directive on the 
internal gas market. Gas distribution and transport were unbundled from gas supply and retail, 
which were opened up to new entrants (Law Decree no. 164 of 2000). The in-house 
distribution of gas, via municipal departments or enterprises, had to cease by 2005, while 
competitive awarding of service contracts was made compulsory (Dorigoni and Portatadino 
2009).8 The deadline for service outsourcing was later put off until 2007, and time extensions 
of a few years were granted under certain conditions, but all time extensions were expected to 
expire by the end of 2012. Nevertheless, only a very limited number of small municipalities 
had actually contracted out the distribution service by that date (i.e. in 2011, the service had 
only been outsourced in 808 out of 6,147 municipalities). Some cities have appealed to 
administrative courts or the Antitrust, requesting a suspension of the obligation to contract 
                                                 
6 The data for this sub-section have been sourced from annual reports, publications and statistics that are 
published by the Italian energy regulatory authority of energy (http://www.autorita.energia.it/it/index.htm) and 
the Italian association of municipal utilities (http://www.federutility.it/). 
7 To counteract excessive spending by local governments, the national Parliament passed a law in 1998, that 
obliged local governments to meet public budget targets, in coherence with the European Union Stability Pact 
(art. 28 of Law 448/1998). 
8 Competitive procedures to contract out the service operation, or to select a private partner, were introduced in 
1994 in the water sector (Carrozza 2010), and were extended to all local services in 2000 (Bognetti and Robotti 
2007). 
11 
 
out. Table 1 reports other information about the sector, especially on ownership arrangements. 
The sector included 775 private or public utilities in 2000, but only 262 utilities ran gas 
distribution in 2011. The sector has been concentrating to a significant degree, but municipal 
ownership has not yet been driven out (Table 1).  
 
Table 1 – Gas distribution industry in Italy: ownership arrangements, 2011 
  Number of enterprises Number of municipalities^
Total 262 6,147 
Private ownership* 125 4,978 
Municipal ownership° 137 1,169 
Source: Personal elaboration of the annual reports and statistics of the Italian energy regulatory authority 
(http://www.autorita.energia.it/it/index.htm) and the Italian association of municipal gas, electricity and water 
utilities (http://www.federutility.it/).  
Notes.  ^: The counts include only municipalities that are reached by gas distribution networks. *: The service is 
offered by a firm whose control rights are held by private investors; consortia of private firms are included. °: 
The service is offered by a municipal department or an enterprise whose control rights are held by one or more 
municipalities.  
 
 
As far as Lombardy is concerned, the municipalities had control rights over 135 enterprises in 
2000. In 2012, the number of municipal enterprises was much smaller, i.e. 34 (-75%), but this 
sector concentration does not mean that municipal ownership had been marginalized. 
Deferred compliance and opposition to contracting out had also touched Lombardy (Section 
4.2). Additionally, IMJVs had become relevant (see Section 4.2). Finally, municipal gas 
distributors had acquired a few middle-sized private operators, and had won competitive 
procedures in other cities. As a result, the number of cities that are served by a municipal 
utility have increased from 287 to 446 (+ 55%).  
In short, the Lombardy gas distribution can be considered an appropriate testing ground for 
the research questions. First, the delivery reform can be argued to act as an exogenous shock, 
which makes the econometric analysis easier. Second, the productive and managerial 
efficiency of the delivery arrangements can be tested, other things being equal, because the 
municipalities in Lombardy are highly different in terms of both size and governance patterns, 
and political and fiscal dimensions (Section 4.2). Finally, transaction costs can be left out of 
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the analysis, because the gas technologies and operating practices are mature and 
standardized, and because the tariffs and quality are determined by a national regulator.    
 
4.2 Sample and variables 
The dataset accounts for the population of the municipalities in Lombardy that owned and 
controlled a gas distributor in 2000, i.e. 135 municipalities that were observed from 2001 to 
2012.9 The sample distribution over the provinces and population is shown in Table A3 in the 
Appendix. Thirty-four and 32 cases out of 135 are located in the Milan and Bergamo 
provinces respectively, while the remaining cases are located in the other 10 provinces. Most 
of the municipalities that own a gas distributor are small or medium sized (i.e. 86 
municipalities have smaller populations than 15,000 inhabitants, and the population only 
exceeds 50,000 inhabitants in 12 sample municipalities).  
Table 2 shows the time distribution of contracting out and inter-municipal joint ventures 
(IMJVs) over the sampled municipalities. In 2012, twelve years after the introduction of the 
reform (Section 4.1), a differentiated landscape emerged. A first group of cities had 
contracted out the distribution service (50 out of 135), although the outsourcing dates differ to 
a great extent. The remaining municipalities have not yet complied with the reform (85 out of 
135), mainly because they have opposed contracting out (for instance by appealing to the 
Antitrust authority or administrative courts). Seventy out of 135 municipalities had merged 
the gas distribution operations with other municipalities during the 2001-2012 period. Inter-
municipal cooperation shows a high correlation with opposition (i.e. 64 resisting 
municipalities out of 85 had also been involved in inter-municipal mergers). Contracting out 
and inter-municipal cooperation events are concentrated in the early reform years. In recent 
                                                 
9 The public internal delivery concerned 140 municipalities, but it was not possible to identify five small 
municipalities that hold control rights of five very small distributors.  
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years, the municipalities seem to have played for time, perhaps because of the possibility of 
having time extensions and due to legislative and regulatory instability. The information on 
the identity of the Lombardy gas distributors has been collected from the yearly records of the 
Italian energy regulatory authority (AEEG), while the information on utility ownership, 
contracting out events and IMJVs has been collected from websites and annual utility reports, 
and has been cross-validated through the yearbooks of the Italian association of municipal 
utilities and newspapers articles.  
 
Table 2 – Contracting out and inter-municipal joint ventures over the 2001-2012 period   
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006  
Contracting out 0 17 16 0 1 0  
Inter-municipal joint ventures 2 22 13 1 8 11   
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
Contracting out 0 2 6 2 6 0 50
Inter-municipal joint ventures 7 4 2 0 0 0 70
Source: Personal elaboration of the yearly lists of the Italian energy regulatory authority 
(http://www.autorita.energia.it/it/index.htm), of the information and annual reports published on utility websites, 
and data from the yearbooks of the Italian association of municipal utilities (http://www.federutility.it/).  
 
Table 3 - List of variables and definitions 
 Definition
Size Overall population of all served municipalities  [00,000]
OthServ Binary variable = 1 if the utility also operates water or electricity services 
Corp Binary variable =  1 if the utility is a corporation
MunConc Index of municipal ownership concentration 
Private Binary variable =  1 if there are private shareholders  
DES Binary variable = 1 if the utility size is greater than the MES
FiscStress Ratio between Current Expenditures and Current Revenues in the local public budget
Left Binary variable =  1 if the local government is affiliated to left-wing parties 
CivLis Binary variable =  1 if the local government is affiliated to local civic parties 
ElecYear Binary variable =  1 for years of local election
ElecPart Local voter turnout in the last regional election
Mountain Binary variable =  1 if the municipality is located in a mountain area 
 
 
The independent variables have been grouped on the basis of the contracting out determinants 
that were identified in Section 3, i.e. productive efficiency, managerial efficiency, social 
choice, ideology and fiscal stress. Controls have been added. The efficiency indicators have 
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been computed using the characteristics of the gas distributors, while the other indicators have 
been measured focusing on the municipality. The variables are listed in Table 3.  
The degree to which utilities are already productively efficient depends on the degree to 
which the scale and scope economies are exploited. Size refers to the population of the served 
municipalities.10 MES is the minimum efficient scale that was established according to the 
econometric literature on cost functions in Italian gas distribution and in particular according 
to Erbetta and Rappuoli (2008), who estimated MES to be equal to 65,000 customers or 
195,000 inhabitants. DES is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 when the utility size 
is greater than the MES. The cross product between DES and (Size-MES) is included in the 
model along with Size to allow the scale economies to vary with the size. OthServ is a dummy 
that is set equal to 1 if the gas distributor also operates water or electricity services, and it 
models economies of scope. The degree to which managerial discretion is limited, i.e. 
managerial efficiency is already satisfactory, is represented by three governance 
characteristics. Corp and Private are two dummy variables. Corp is set equal to 1 when the 
gas distributor is a corporation, and Private is set equal to 1 when stockholding is partially 
private. MunConc measures the extent to which municipal ownership is concentrated through 
a Hirsh-Herfindal index, with focus on municipal ownership: it is set equal to 1 if there is only 
one municipal owner; it tends to 0 if the IMJV includes several small municipal owners.  
The alternative determinants of contracting out have been grouped into three categories: fiscal 
stress, ideology and social choice. FiscStress refers to the ratio between current expenditures 
and current revenues. Ideology is captured by two dummy variables: Left takes on a value of  
1 when the local government is progressive, i.e. affiliated to left-wing parties; CivLis takes on 
a value of 1 when a civic party or movement governs the city, i.e. a party that has no official 
connection to traditional national parties and which campaigns about local issues. The 
                                                 
10 The population of the served area seems to be an acceptable proxy since the gas consumption per user is quite 
homogeneous in Lombardy. 
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political (and social) activism of citizens is summarized by ElecPart, the turnout in the 
regional election.11 Finally, two control variables have been added on. ElecYear takes on a 
value of 1 in the year of the local election. Mountain is set equal to 1 when the city is 
officially classified as mountainous, a circumstance that may alter the scale and scope 
economies.12   
The descriptive statistics and data sources are reported in Table 4. By definition when a 
municipality contracts out the service, it exits from the analysis of the resistance of local 
governments. Therefore, the sample panel is unbalanced over time, and amounts to 1,243 
observations. 
 
Table 4 - Descriptive statistics and data sources of the independent variables 
 Obs Mean Sd Max Min Sources 
Size 1243 1.352 3.019 25.128 0.003 
Information and annual reports 
published on utility websites 
OthServ 1243 0.485 0.499 1 0 
Corp 1243 0.858 0.349 1 0 
Private 1243 0.167 0.373 1 0 
MunConc 1243 0.657 0.386 1 0.011 
DES 1243 0.142 0.350 1 0 Personal elaboration on Erbetta and Rappuoli (2008) 
FiscStress 1243 0.942 0.067 1.378 0.596 
Databases of the Italian Ministry 
of the Interior (Local Finance and 
Elections) 
Left 1243 0.268 0.443 1 0 
CivLis 1243 0.295 0.456 1 0 
ElecYear 1243 0.194 0.396 1 0 
ElecPart 1243 0.735 0.053 0.857 0.571 
Mountain 1243 0.188 0.391 1 0 Database of the Italian Ministry of Economic Development
 
4.3 Models 
Most of previous studies have used cross-sectional data to model contracting out decision. 
The dependent variable was either a binary choice variable (i.e. internal v. external delivery of 
                                                 
11 Regional rather than local election turnout has been chosen to establish fundamental political participation, 
irrespectively of contingent city-specific effects. 
12 This variable is similar to the rural status of municipalities in the US (see Hefetz and Warner 2012).   
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given services; e.g. Menard and Saussier 2000, Bel and Miralles 2003, Dijkgraaf et al. 2003, 
Walls et al. 2005, Tavares and Camoes 2007), or a limited continuous variable (i.e. proportion 
of the outsourced services; Ferris 1986, Morgan et al. 1988, Greene 1996, Warner and Hefetz 
2008). Nevertheless, the delivery choice can relate to historical rather than contemporary 
measures of city or service characteristics (Boyne 1998), and time matters for contracting out 
decisions. This has only been recognized recently.  Joassart-Marcelli and Musso (2005) have 
used panel data to track changes in public service delivery over a 15-year time period, 
considering 11 municipal services. Gonzalez-Gomes and Guardiola (2009) and Miralles 
(2009) have used duration models to explain the decision to contract out water services in 
Spain.  
Since opportunity existed of following the Lombardy municipalities over a period of 12 years, 
it has been quite natural to model them using a duration model that can handle the whole 
range of attitudes towards contracting out, i.e. early externalization, deferred compliance and 
opposition till the deadline (Sections 4.1 and 4.2). The hazard rate λ is the probability of 
contracting out at time t, conditional to internal delivery up to t, i.e. the length of time that a 
municipality has spent before contracting out the gas distribution. The present observations 
are on a yearly basis, and has been made use of discrete time duration models. The hazard rate 
for municipality i observed up to time j is as follows: 
),|(),( ijiiijij XjTjTPXj ≥==λ .                                                                        
Ti is the discrete time survival variable of the municipality which is modeled as the 
combination of two functions, i.e. dependence on time and the effect of the covariates Xij on 
the decision to contract out, after having controlled for time dependence. The impact of 
covariates is modeled through a binary probit model.13 Time dependence T is the baseline 
                                                 
13 An admissible distribution function was needed for the hazard rates. An obvious choice was the standard 
normal distribution, which makes it possible to estimate the coefficients using a probit model. Since there are 
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hazard function, i.e. the probability of contracting out in the absence of covariates. In this 
case, time dependence can distinguish local governments’ decisions from confounding factors 
(e.g. changes in nation-wide regulations, exhaustion of targets, favorable economic climate, 
learning about service contracts). In order to obtain time dependence flexibility, cubic splines, 
i.e. a smoothed version of time dummies, have been used (Beck et al. 1998).  
The authors are well aware of the fact that local governments also consider inter-municipal 
joint ventures (IMJVs; Sections 4.1 and 4.2). The correlation between IMJVs and contracting 
out is equal to -0.824, i.e. local governments seem to perceive them as alternative but 
interdependent restructuring measures. Therefore, a two-equation duration model has been 
used, and a so called Mixed model has been estimated (Roodman 2009). The first equation is 
a contracting out duration model and the second equation is a duration model of the decision 
to cooperate with other municipalities.14 An alternative approach to the simultaneity between 
IMJV and contracting out decisions is offered by an Instrumental Variable (IV) model. Some 
explanatory variables of the contracting out model, i.e. Size, DES and MunConc, are 
potentially impacted by the choice to enter an IMJV, a decision that is highly correlated to the 
decision to contract out the service. In order to cope with the kind of endogeneity here 
mentioned, the endogenous variables have been instrumented with the same variables 
measured at the beginning of the period. IV estimates have been used to test the endogeneity 
of the variables and to check the robustness of the Mixed model estimates. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
small differences between the probit and other specification in this context (Beck et al. 1998), it was decided to 
use a probit duration model, which allows the potential of the Stata software package to be exploited for the 
mixed models (Roodman 2009). 
14 Each of the equations in the Mixed Model is a discrete time duration equation that shares with the other one 
all the explanatory variables except those that refer to the baseline hazard function, which are different in the two 
equations (Roodman 2009).  
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5. Empirical findings 
The results of the empirical analysis on contracting out are illustrated in this Section.  
Table 5a and Table 5b report the Mixed model estimates, i.e. the contracting out and inter-
municipal cooperation equations in three different specifications. The ETD model includes 
variables that represent incentives to search for productive and managerial efficiency, and 
time dependence. The EOD model also includes determinants other than efficiency, but not 
time dependence. The ETDOD model includes all the covariates and time dependence. The 
discussion on the empirical findings will focus on models with time dependence, because the 
inclusion of time dependence was tested through Wald tests that rejected exclusion (i.e. the 
χ2(3) statistics was invariably estimated to be different from 0 with a 99% confidence level).  
The EOD equation estimates have only been provided for comparison purposes. The 
contracting out equation can exploit the whole sample, which includes 1,243 observations (i.e. 
135 municipalities and 12 years, but the time series are right-censored when the service is 
contracted out). Since inter-municipal cooperation, by definition, can occur only before 
contracting out, the IMJV equation is estimated on a smaller sample, i.e. 725 observations. 
Nevertheless, the two equations has been jointly estimated (i.e. there is a common maximum 
likelihood function). The estimates have been obtained using the Stata software package, 
version 12.1.  Finally, three and four spline coefficients have resulted to be necessary to fit the 
time dependence of contracting out and inter-municipal respectively. For the sake of brevity, 
the Instrumental Variable duration model estimates are not reported here but are available 
upon request from the authors. They suggest that the endogeneity of Size, DES and MunConc 
is not a serious issue (i.e. the residual correlations between the instrumental equations and the 
duration model of contracting out are not significantly different from zero). 
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Table 5a – Estimates of the Mixed duration models: Contracting out equation 
Independent Variables 
Equation 1 - Contracting out
ETD Model: Efficiency 
and time dependence 
EOD Model: 
Efficiency, and other 
determinants 
ETDOD Model: 
Efficiency, time 
dependence and other 
determinants
    
Size -0.471** -0.382* -0.431* 
 (-1.99) (-1.92) (-1.81) 
DES*(Size-MES) 0.360 0.247 0.294 
 (1.18) (0.89) (0.93) 
OthServ -0.175 -0.232 -0.190 
 (-0.96) (-1.33) (-1.05) 
Corp -1.500*** -1.344*** -1.627***
 (-5.23) (-5.94) (-5.53) 
Private 0.157 0.169 0.157 
 (0.66) (0.78) (0.65) 
MunConc -0.096 -0.139 -0.071 
 (-0.29) (-0.43) (-0.20) 
FiscStress  0.469 0.729 
  (0.37) (0.53) 
Left  -0.601*** -0.637** 
  (-2.67) (-2.42) 
CivLis  0.004 0.072 
  (0.02) (0.38) 
ElecYear  -0.221 -0.255 
  (-0.86) (-1.01) 
ElecPart  -4.310** -1.921 
  (-2.45) (-0.90) 
Mountain  -0.215 -0.117 
  (-1.00) (-0.55) 
Cons -1.465***
(-3.52)
2.448
(1.28)
-0.679 
(-0.32) 
No. of observations 1243 1243 1243 
Spline coefficients 0.351***
(2.69)
 0.444***
(3.15) 
 -1.122**
(-2.29)
 -1.463***
(-2.68) 
 2.671**
(2.37)
 3.335***
(2.71) 
Wald chi2(k) 81.57 (k=9) 123.22 (k=12) 105.15 (k=15)
p>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Atanhrho_12 -1.218***
(-2.71)
-1.703***
(-13.18)
-2.444***
(-5.36) 
Notes. t statistics in parentheses; ***, **, * : 99%, 95% and 90% significance levels in a two-tail test. 
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Table 5b – Estimates of the Mixed duration models: Inter-municipal cooperation 
equation  
 
Independent Variables 
Equation 2 – IMJV equation
ETD Model: Efficiency 
and time dependence 
EOD Model: 
Efficiency, and other 
determinants 
ETDOD Model: 
Efficiency, time 
dependence and other 
determinants
    
Size 0.455** 0.631*** 0.606***
 (2.16) (3.22) (2.70) 
DES*(Size-MES) -0.464** -0.641*** -0.627***
 (-2.06) (-3.04) (-2.64) 
OthServ 0.097 0.078 0.118 
 (0.58) (0.47) (0.64) 
Corp -0.589*** -0.312* -0.631***
 (-2.88) (-1.92) (-3.16) 
Private -0.429* -0.310 -0.349 
 (-1.74) (-1.38) (-1.40) 
MunConc -0.127 -0.160 -0.197 
 (-0.40) (-0.55) (-0.58) 
FiscStress  0.298 1.275 
  (0.31) (0.99) 
Left  0.253* 0.198 
  (1.81) (1.20) 
CivLis  0.186 0.211 
  (1.09) (1.11) 
ElecYear  -0.123 -0.142 
  (-0.71) (-0.79) 
ElecPart  1.403 -0.478 
  (1.15) (-0.23) 
Mountain  0.518*** 0.555***
  (3.04) (2.92) 
Cons -2.047***
(-4.78)
-2.675*
(-1.82)
-3.160 
(-1.52) 
No. of observations – 
Equation 2  
725 725 725 
Spline coefficients 0.560***
(3.91)
 0.608***
(3.99) 
 -3.912***
(-2.80)
 -4.143***
(-2.88) 
 8.851***
(2.59)
 9.217***
(2.65) 
 -14.71**
(-2.39)
 -14.77** 
(-2.33) 
Wald chi2(k) 81.57 (k=9) 123.22 (k=12) 105.15 (k=15)
p>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Atanhrho_12 -1.218***
(-2.71)
-1.703***
(-13.18)
-2.444***
(-5.36) 
Notes. t statistics in parentheses; ***, **, * : 99%, 95% and 90% significance levels in a two-tail test. 
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5.1 Analysis of the research questions  
The efficiency of resistance toward contracting out is the focal issue of the present analysis. In 
order to test the research questions, the coefficient estimates from the contracting out 
equations are discussed (Table 5a). It should be recalled that the duration model can be 
decomposed into two parts (Section 4.3): a probit model without time dependence, i.e. the 
impact of independent variables on the contracting out probability at any time; time 
dependence, i.e. the variation of contracting out probability over time if the independent 
variables are held constant. In what follows, attention is focused on the impact of the 
covariates, while the time dependence of contracting out is discussed in another sub-section 
(5.2). 
As far as research question (A) is concerned, it has been tested whether contracting out is less 
likely to occur in municipalities that own larger gas distributors (scale economies) or utilities 
operating gas distribution and other network services (economies of scope). It has also been 
checked whether the incentives to outsource the service change when the utility reaches the 
minimum efficient scale of the sector (MES, almost 200,000 inhabitants). The Size coefficient 
is different from zero and negative at a 10% level of significance in the most comprehensive 
model (ETDOD, third column in Table 5a), and at the 5% or 10% levels in the other models. 
The sum of the Size and DES*(Size-MES) coefficients is not significantly different from 0 (e.g. 
p-value of the χ2(1) test equal to 0.431, ETDOD model, Table 5a). Municipalities that are 
served by small municipal utilities have been found to be more likely to contract out, a result 
that is coherent with the findings of other empirical studies (McGuire et al. 1987; Hirsch 
1995; Bel and Miralles 2003; Dijkgraaf et al. 2003). The outsourcing probability decreases as 
the size approaches MES, but then it reaches a saturation threshold, i.e. if the size grows 
beyond MES, the outsourcing probability no longer changes. Large utilities can 
counterbalance the lack of productive efficiency gains from contracting out with other 
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advantages. For instance, some analyses have found that larger municipalities are more likely 
to privatize (Ferris 1986; Greene 1996; Gonzalez-Gomes and Guardiola 2009), because they 
can average transaction costs over a larger population. The willingness to preserve the 
economies of scope has not been found to play a role (the OthServ coefficient is not 
significant in any of the three models, Table 5a). However, it has not been possible to 
compare this finding with previous analyses, as none has been found that considered multi-
utilities cases. It has been concluded that resistance to contracting out, in the case of Italian 
gas distribution, could have been caused by an emphasis of the municipalities on productive 
efficiency. Local governments are more likely to stick to public delivery if they have already 
exploited scale economies, i.e. if they have already reached the minimum efficient scale in 
service operation. The empirical results of the IV model also confirm that contracting out 
decisions made by municipalities are aimed at the exploitation of scale economies, even 
though the significance of the coefficients is weaker.   
Contracting out benefits include an improvement in managerial efficiency (research question 
(B)). However, the discretion of utility managers can be reduced by other restructuring 
measures, such as corporatization or partial privatization (i.e. stockholding sale without 
transferring control rights to the private sector). Research question (B) test has focused on the 
Corp and Private coefficients. The impact of corporatization on the decision to contract out 
gas distribution is different from 0 and negative at the 1% significance level (Table 5a, all 
models). The Private coefficient instead is never significant. The incremental advantages of 
contracting out are thus relatively small if the administration department has already been 
changed in a company. Corporatized utilities resemble modern corporations, where managers 
are easier to monitor than bureaucrats (Aivazian et al. 2005; Bilodeau et al. 2007; Cambini et 
al. 2011). The reason why partial privatization does not play a comparable role has remained 
unsolved, but it should be recalled that corporatization needs to be necessarily implemented 
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before partial privatization. If so, the two coefficients can interact. The concentration of 
municipal ownership, as represented by MunConc, does not affect the probability outsourcing 
significantly, but there are diverging theories on its impact on efficiency (3.2). It is here 
concluded that local governments are more likely to stick to public delivery if the governance 
of service provision has already been tightened through corporatization. The empirical results 
of the IV model have provided similar empirical evidence. 
 
5.2 Time dependence  
The three Mixed models appear to be well specified, according to the Wald test reported at the 
bottom of both Tables 5a and 5b. Furthermore, unobserved heterogeneity or frailty, i.e. the 
hazard related to residual differences between municipalities, has been tested, and has not 
been found significant at the standard confidence levels.15  
An additional reason that makes us fairly confident in the results that have been discussed so 
far is provided by the analysis of time dependence. First, the two research questions have 
been confirmed after having removed the time trend of contracting out from the probit 
estimates in the ETD and ETDOD models (Table 5a). As a result, the acceptation of the 
“efficiency hypothesis” on resistance towards contracting out is not biased by time-specific 
confounding effects (e.g. regulation changes or the economic cycle). Second, the present 
estimates can be used to simulate the time trend of contracting out, in order to carry out an ex-
post comparison with the real evolution of the gas distribution sector in Lombardy (Section 
4.1). Figure 1 reports the time trend that has been simulated from the ETDOD model in Table 
5a. The baseline hazard function has been assigned the spline coefficients and the count of 
years as time variables. All the independent variables have been set to their mean values, in 
order to have realistic values of the probability of contracting out (i.e. they only shift the time 
                                                 
15 The likelihood ratio test has rejected the null hypothesis that the heterogeneity variance is zero for contracting 
out (p-value = 0.112) and inter-municipal cooperation (p-value=0.132).  
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trend). The graph in Figure 1 represents the evolution of the probability of contracting out that 
a “mean” Lombardy municipality would have experienced over time, on the basis of the 
reform of gas distribution delivery and other year-specific effects, if the efficiency, fiscal and 
political variables did not have any influence. It appears to be consistent with at least two 
aspects of the dynamics that have been summarized in Section 4.1. In 2005, a regulatory 
change postponed the expiry dates of the contracts in force by two years, and slowed down 
the overall process. The simulated time trend has captured the effect of the shift in the reform 
deadline quite precisely, as can be seen from the 2005-2008 decrease. Apart from the 
slowdown caused by the regulation change, the simulated contracting out probability kept 
rising over the whole period, which is coherent with the obligation to award a new gas 
distribution service contract by 2012. 
Figure 1 – Simulated time dependence of the contracting out probability, ETDOD model 
 
 
 
5.3 Other determinants of contracting out 
The other possible determinants of contracting out, i.e. fiscal stress, ideology, political and 
social participation of citizens, are now examined. The only variable that has been shown to 
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of the contracting out models that encompass determinants different from efficiency (EOD 
and ETDOD, last two columns in Table 5a). The local governments that are affiliated to left-
wing parties are more likely to resist contracting out. This result is consistent with previous 
analyses concerning both the US and European countries (Dubin and Navarro 1988; Dijkgraaf 
et al. 2003; Walls et al. 2005; Zullo 2009). The political and social activism of citizens, as 
measured by ElecPart, i.e. the local turnout of voters, has been found to strengthen the 
resistance towards contracting out in the EOD model (i.e. a negative coefficient at a 95% 
significance level, second column in Table 5), but it loses any significance when the time 
dependence of contracting out is taken into account (ETDOD model). A possible explanation 
for the weakness of the result is the steady decrease in electoral participation in Lombardy 
over the last decade, i.e. the passing of time is correlated to ElecPart. The health of the public 
budget has been modeled through FiscStress, which has never been found to be significant 
(all models, Table 5a). The negligible role of fiscal stress is in line with evidence offered in 
previous works on individual services (McGuire et al. 1987; Chandler and Feuille 1994; 
Walls et al. 2005; Miralles 2009). Most of the studies that have found a significant influence 
of fiscal restraints have in fact analyzed the whole service contract portfolio of local 
governments (Ferris 1986; Morgan et al. 1988; Kodrzycki 1998; Hebdon and Jalette 2008). 
  
5.4 Inter-municipal cooperation: Interaction with contracting out   
For the sake of brevity no comments have been made on estimates of the IMJV equation 
(Table 5b). Attention has instead been focused on the mutual relationship between contracting 
out and inter-municipal cooperation. Many papers have tried to compare them, and the 
estimates reported in this paper would allow such a comparison to be made. Nonetheless, the 
present sample and the peculiar context offered by the reform of the gas distribution sector in 
Italy have made it possible to estimate the two processes together, and to estimate the 
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interdependence between them. The degree of interdependence is summarized by the 
Atanhrho_12 statistic, which is reported at the bottom of Tables 5a and 5b, i.e. a 
transformation of the correlation between the residuals of the two processes. This statistic is 
different from 0 and negative at a 1% level of significance. The result seems to suggest that 
the ex-ante preference of municipalities for one of the two restructuring measures is related to 
unobservable variables. In other words, inter-municipal cooperation does not cause, by itself, 
resistance to contracting out, but it would seem to suggest a different approach to service 
delivery. Contracting out offers the advantages of privatization, while inter-municipal 
cooperation keeps the service public and bestows a local identity on the service provision 
(Warner and Hebdon 2001; Hefetz et al. 2012). Local governments are likely to perceive 
these strategies as alternative and to choose their approach to restructuring on the basis of the 
relative costs and benefits, as measured by the coefficient estimates, and on a latent attitude. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper is an attempt to improve the understanding of the reasons why the diffusion of 
public service contracts in local governments appears to be slow and not to be able to 
challenge the dominance of public delivery, even when the restructuring experience is at an 
advanced stage. The degree to which public services are outsourced to the private sector is, of 
course, influenced by transaction costs, which vary greatly from country to country and sector 
to sector. However, a single-sector and single-country case can shed light on the additional 
motivations behind the fundamental reluctance of local governments to adopt contracting out. 
Therefore, we consider a reform that was introduced in 2000 in the Italian gas distribution. 
The efficiency of resistance has been assessed, and it has been found that municipalities are 
more likely to stick to public delivery if they are already exploiting scale economies, and have 
already reduced the discretion of public managers, by having corporatized the service 
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operation. Beside the ideology of the government in power, other determinants, such as public 
budget restraints or the activism of citizens, are less likely to play an important role.  
The present analysis adds new results and methods to the research on public service 
restructuring over a few dimensions. Not only does the paper confirm that the productivity of 
service provision is taken into account by local governments that have to choose the delivery 
mode, it also emphasizes the role played by the search for managerial efficiency, by modeling 
the governance of service provision in a comprehensive way. Moreover, the empirical 
approach shows that the empirical evidence can be strengthened in this field in three ways, i.e. 
using policy experiments as an empirical setting (as we did with the reform of the Italian gas 
sector), modeling the simultaneity of inter-municipal cooperation and contracting out 
decisions, and estimating the time dependence of restructuring decisions. All in all, the 
empirical results would seem to confirm that resistance towards contracting out can be 
consistent with a local governments’ rational assessment of the incremental benefits and costs 
that arise from contracting out, and in particular with the search for efficiency.  
The paper also leaves some research avenues open. A comprehensive test on the theory that 
the reluctance of a local government to contract out can be efficient requires a careful 
representation of the political patronage practices, i.e. the identification and measurement of 
city-level rather than state- or country-level indicators. Models should also encompass the 
spatial and temporal variations of price regulation and geographical aspects of the service, 
such as network deployment or the topology of served jurisdictions.  Furthermore, empirical 
analyses of delivery choices should consider a wider set of restructuring measures, not just 
contracting out and inter-municipal cooperation, by taking into account the mutual 
interdependence between different strategies. Finally, greater attention should be paid to the 
diffusion of service contracts in European Union countries, through the construction and 
analysis of consistent cross-country datasets.   
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Appendix 
Table A1 – Distribution of new service contracts over municipal services, 8 largest EU countries 
Services  2009-2011 count of new service contracts§ 
Average yearly 
growth rate 
2009-2011 count  per 
10,000 inhabitants# 
Sewage, solid waste and 
cleaning services 6,281 4.4% 0.16 
Health and social work 
services 2,480 5.1% 0.06 
Gardens and parks 
maintenance 1,695 0.8% 0.04 
Public transport services 1,179 -5.5% 0.03 
Streets and roads 
maintenance 929 -2.5% 0.02 
Public utility services 321 24.3% 0.01 
Public security services 203 -2.4% 0.01 
Cultural and sporting 
services 453 -14.4% 0.01 
8 largest EU countries^  13,249 3.1% 0.34 
Source: Online supplement of the Official Journal of the European Union (so called “Tenders Electronic Daily”). 
Notes.  §: Contract notices have been drawn and classified with a focus on local and regional authorities as 
contract sources. Only municipal services have been considered, i.e. those public services that are under the 
responsibility of municipalities, according to the census of local governments prepared by the Council of 
European Municipalities and Regions. A detailed classification is available upon request from the authors. #: 
The number of EU inhabitants was equal to 502,120,829 in 2011. ^: The sums by services and by countries are 
different, because some contract notices pertained to more than one service class. The EU largest countries are: 
Germany, France, The United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Poland, Romania and the Netherlands.  
 
Table A2 – Distribution of new service contracts over largest EU countries, municipal services 
Countries 2009-2011 count of new service contracts§ 
Average yearly 
growth rate 
2009-2011 count per 
10,000 inhabitants# 
France 4,980 1.5% 0.77 
The Netherlands 766 -1.6% 0.46 
Italy 2,379 10.5% 0.39 
The United Kingdom 2,118 -4.5% 0.34 
Poland 1,071 11.6% 0.28 
Spain 673 -5.8% 0.15 
Germany 1,117 12.0% 0.14 
Romania 145 -2.7% 0.07 
8 largest EU countries^  13,249 3.1% 0.34 
All EU countries 15,788 4.2% 0.31 
Source: Online supplement of the Official Journal of the European Union (so called “Tenders Electronic Daily”). 
Notes. §: Contract notices have been drawn and classified with a focus on local and regional authorities as 
contract sources. Only municipal services have been considered, i.e. those public services that are under the 
responsibility of municipalities, according to the census of local governments prepared by the Council of 
European Municipalities and Regions. A detailed classification is available upon request from the authors. #: 
The number of EU inhabitants was equal to 502,120,829 in 2011. ^: The sums by services and by countries are 
different, because some contract notices pertained to more than one service class. The EU largest countries are: 
Germany, France, The United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Poland, Romania and The Netherlands.  
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Table A3 - Distribution of the sampled municipalities over provinces and population ranges 
Province < 5,000 5,001-15,000 15,001-50,000 > 50,000 Total
Bergamo 18 11 2 1 32
Brescia 0 5 3 1 9
Como 0 4 2 1 7
Cremona 7 4 1 1 13
Lecco 0 2 1 0 3
Lodi 2 3 1 0 6
Milan 4 14 13 3 34
Mantova 2 3 1 0 6
Monza 1 2 10 1 14
Pavia 0 2 1 2 5
Sondrio 0 0 1 0 1
Varese 0 2 1 2 5
Total 34 52 37 12 135
Source: National Institute of Statistics 
 
 
